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HOME RUN OR STRIKE OUT: CAN BASEBALL ARBITRATION
SOLVE AMERICA’S MEDICAL DEBT CRISIS?
Sarah Jolley1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2012, a New York woman named Claudia Knafo found herself in need of a
complicated spinal surgery.2 She immediately began the long and arduous process of selecting
a physician in her insurance network, even going so far as to interview prospective surgeons
to confirm their in-network status.3 Claudia finally selected a well-regarded local surgeon,
whose website verified his in-network status with her health insurance plan, after calling his
office to confirm.4 Weeks after her successful spinal surgery, Claudia received notice that the
doctor’s receptionist and website were incorrect—the surgeon was not actually in-network.5
Claudia’s health insurance plan provided $66,0000 of the $101,000 value of the operation, but
she still found herself saddled with a surprise medical bill of $35,000.6 To add insult to injury,
her health insurance company later determined it had overpaid, and instructed Claudia to
recover the $66,000 from her surgeon.7 Faced with what she describes as a “nuclear attack”
from both her surgeon and insurer, Claudia began searching for help.8 Her story found its way
to insurance regulators, consumer advocacy groups, the state attorney general’s office, and
finally New York State lawmakers.9
What Claudia experienced is an all-too-common practice called “surprise medical
billing,” which occurs when a patient unknowingly receives medical care from a provider
outside of their insurance network.10 In recent years, surprise medical billing has emerged as a
major consumer protection issue, with as many as 1 in 5 patients receiving a surprise bill after
surgery.11 A 2020 study conducted by Yale University researchers examined the healthcare
data of 350,000 patients covered by a large commercial insurer, and revealed twenty percent
1
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received a surprise medical bill after surgery.12 The lack of transparency between patients,
providers, and insurers that leads to surprise medical billing presents a major problem not
only for patients, but also the American healthcare system at large.13
When Claudia and patients with similar experiences started advocating for change,
their state legislatures listened.14 Beginning with New York, states began passing healthcare
reform laws to prevent patients from receiving surprise medical bills.15 Using a unique form
of arbitration originally designed to settle salary disputes among Major League Baseball
teams and players, these states require providers and insurance groups to agree on a fair price
for the medical services in question or plead their case before an arbitrator.16 This style of
arbitration, often referred to as “final-offer” or “baseball” arbitration, has since been adopted
into federal legislation designed to combat surprise medical billing on the national level.17
This article focuses on the application of baseball arbitration to surprise medical
billing disputes, an issue that has gained increased attention at both the state and federal level.
Part II examines the history of baseball arbitration and its contemporary applications. Part III
explores the growing problem of medical debt and surprise medical billing in the United
States, examining its impact on patients and the economy. Part IV discusses state level efforts
to combat surprise medical billing debt and the use of baseball arbitration to settle disputes
between hospitals and insurance companies. Finally, Part V analyzes the effect of similar
baseball arbitration provisions in upcoming federal legislation. While surprise medical billing
reforms protect consumers by reducing the amount of medical debt incurred from out-ofnetwork treatment, final-offer provisions in legislation may provide unwanted incentives for
hospitals and insurers to raise healthcare prices. Can America’s favorite pastime provide the
solution to our ongoing surprise medical billing crisis without causing healthcare costs to
skyrocket? The answer hinges on the criteria arbitrators are allowed to consider when
selecting a final offer.
II. BASEBALL ARBITRATION’S ORIGINS AND CONTEMPORARY USES
“Final-offer” arbitration, also known as “high/low” or “baseball” arbitration, is a
form of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”) best known for its modern application to
salary disputes in Major League Baseball (“MLB”).18 Final-offer arbitration is now so closely
associated with professional baseball salary negotiations that the terms “final-offer
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arbitration” and “baseball arbitration” are synonymous.19 In a baseball arbitration, both parties
attend a hearing where they argue their position and present a single final offer to a panel of
arbitrators, who in turn select only one of the parties’ offers.20 This system contrasts with
more traditional forms of arbitration, which give arbitrators broad authority to make
settlement decisions that lean towards one offer or another or simply split the difference
between the parties’ offers.21 The baseball arbitration hearing acts as the final step in the
negotiation process, and is implemented when parties cannot reach an agreement through
other means of ADR such as negotiation or mediation.22
Final-offer arbitration first emerged in MLB during the 1970s as a result of
collective bargaining and salary negotiations between owners and player associations.23 Prior
to the introduction of baseball arbitration, players held only one-year contracts, which
allowed them to frequently switch teams.24 To combat the problem of revolving players,
teams often entered into informal agreements where they promised not to poach certain
valuable players.25 These informal agreements led to the development of a “reserve system”
that effectively forced certain players to remain on one team.26 In response to disagreements
over salary negotiation and team mobility, MLB players worked with the National Labor
Relations Board to form a union and begin collective bargaining.27 The 1973 Basic
Agreement featured the first introduction of salary arbitration provisions to MLB’s collective
bargaining agreement.28
Baseball arbitration has many purported benefits for players and teams—
incentivizing settlement, lowering costs, balancing interests, and producing fair market
results.29 Prior to an arbitration, the parties participate in a series of initial negotiations to
adjust the player’s salary.30 An arbitration deadline is set for the upcoming season, and if the
parties fail to successfully negotiate a salary agreement, they proceed with the arbitration
hearing.31 Players and teams are still free to reach a settlement agreement once they begin the
arbitration process; it is not unheard of for parties to reach an agreement right outside the

19

Id.
Id.
21
Id.
22
Final Offer Arbitration Supplementary Rules, INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION, (Jan. 1,
2015),
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23
Roger I. Abrams, Inside Baseball’s Salary Arbitration Process, 6 Univ. Chi. L Sch. Roundtable 55, 58
(1999) (discussing the history of baseball’s salary arbitration process).
24
Bibek Das, Salary Arbitration and the Effects on Major League Baseball and Baseball Players, 1 DEPAUL J.
SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55 (2003)
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id. at 58.
28
Id.
29
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30
Id.
31
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20
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hearing room.32 This arbitration system lowers costs and prevents delays, as it keeps players
and teams out of costly court battles and resolves the salary dispute before the next season.33
Perhaps most importantly, baseball arbitration purportedly produces equitable
results and encourages parties to submit reasonable bids that tend towards the median.34
Unlike other forms of arbitration where arbiters can compromise by selecting a number
between the parties’ bids, baseball arbitration requires arbitrators to choose one of the parties’
offers.35 As the arbitrators have instructions to select the bid closest to the player’s “real
market value” in this winner-takes-all system, parties have incentives to submit reasonable
rather than aspirational offers for fear their bid will be rejected.36 Given that parties have a
greater chance of reaching a mutually agreeable result through negotiation, they have
incentives to avoid the arbitration process altogether. Because only one party’s proposal is
selected by the arbitration panel, participants might secure more of their interests through
negotiation before turning to arbitration as a last resort.
While baseball arbitration is most closely associated with its long history as a salary
dispute resolution tool in MLB, in recent years it has risen in popularity as an ADR strategy
in other areas.37 Today, parties apply baseball arbitration to disputes involving international
negotiations over trade, mergers and acquisitions, real estate, tax, insurance, and other
commercial issues.38 For instance, since the early 2000s, the United States routinely inserts
baseball-style arbitration provisions into international tax treaties with countries such as
Canada, France, Germany, and Belgium.39 Through these treaties, countries solve corporate
tax disputes over who should collect multinational companies’ transfer pricing taxes through
binding baseball-style arbitration.40 Revenue agents from both countries submit proposals to
tax arbitration panels made up of three experts, one chosen by each country and the third by
the other two experts.41 The United States has experienced great success using this method of
arbitration, collecting as much as $100 million in international tax disputes with Canada.42
These promising results have created a broader interest in applying baseball-style arbitration
provisions to other industries.43

32

Maury Brown, Who’s Winning The MLB Salary Arbitration Game? Here’s Data From 1974 to 2015,
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Id. at 16.
39
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III. STATE LEVEL USES OF BASEBALL ARBITRATION IN SURPRISE BILLING
REFORM
As the issue of medical debt grows in the United States, some state legislatures are
looking to combat surprise medical bills, which are believed to be a contributing factor in
overall medical debt.44 Surprise medical billing occurs when patients are charged for
unknowingly receiving out-of-network care.45 A few states, such as New York, New Jersey,
Georgia, Virginia and Illinois, have implemented legislation requiring hospitals and insurance
companies to go through a final-offer arbitration process to settle disputes over out-ofnetwork costs before transferring costs to their patients.46
A. The Growing Problem of Medical Debt
The Census Bureau’s Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) revealed
that as of 2017, roughly nineteen percent of American households have medical debt.47 The
distribution of medical debt was associated with factors such as race, education, and familial
status.48 Black and Hispanic households were more likely to carry medical debt than white
households.49 Households with young children were also more likely to carry medical debt
than those without children.50 Households with a member who had attained some college but
not graduated with a degree were more likely to carry medical debt than households with
members who completed higher education or no higher education.51 Overall, the results of the
Census Bureau’s study reveal that the issue of medical debt disproportionately affects
families with children and people of color.
Nineteen percent of Americans experiencing medical debt may not seem like an
urgent problem, but the actual monetary amount associated with medical debt is staggering.
Today, the total medical debt carried by Americans is estimated to be $140 billion, almost
double earlier estimates of $81 billion in the mid 2000s.52 A group of researchers from
Harvard, Stanford, and the National Bureau of Economic Research reached this number by
analyzing the consumer credit reports for a nationally representative group of individuals
from January 2009 and June 2020.53 Their study’s findings revealed that medical debt began

44
David Blumenthal & Shanoor Seervai, The Underlying Causes of Surprise Medical Bills, Commonwealth
Fund (Apr. 26, 2019), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/blog/2019/underlying-causes-surprise-medicalbills.
45
Id.
46
Maanasa Kona, State Balance-Billing Protections, Commonwealth Fund (Feb. 5, 2021),
https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/maps-and-interactives/2021/feb/state-balance-billingprotections.
47
Neil Bennett et al., 19% of U.S. Households Could Not Afford to Pay for Medical Care Right Away, United
States Census Bureau (Apr. 7, 2021), https://www.census.gov/library/stories/2021/04/who-had-medical-debtin- united-states.html. (The median amount carried by most households was $2,000).
48
Id.
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50
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51
Id.
52
Bennett, supra note 47.
53
Raymond Kluender et al., Medical Debt in the US, 2009-2020, 326 JAMA 250, 251 (2021).
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to exceed national levels of other forms of consumer debt around 2014 and has consistently
outpaced other forms of consumer debt since then.54
In keeping with its upward trend, medical debt has also become one of the nation’s
leading causes of bankruptcy.55 As many as two-thirds of all bankruptcies in the United States
are tied to medical issues, and more than 530,000 families enter bankruptcy each year because
of unpaid medical bills.56 Foreclosures, living beyond one’s means, providing help to friends
or relatives, student loans, and divorce or separation all trail behind medical bills as causes of
bankruptcy.57
B. Surprise Medical Billing
Some might attribute exorbitant healthcare costs and medical debt solely to
uninsured patients, but many of the patients saddled with burdensome medical debt are
covered by insurance.58 Patients risk losing their healthcare if they are suddenly fired from
their job or if long-term illness causes them to lose their employment because medical
insurance is often tied to employment in the United States.59 A significant group of insured
Americans struggling with unpaid medical costs can trace their debt back to one thing—
surprise medical bills, also known as “balance” bills.60
Surprise medical billing occurs when patients unexpectedly or unknowingly receive
medical care from an out-of-network provider.61 This may occur when a patient receives
emergency medical care at an in-network facility, but the patient is seen by consulting
physicians (like emergency room doctors) who do not have contracts with their insurance
plan.62 Emergency room services are notorious for surprise medical billing.63 An estimated
one-in-five inpatient emergency room visits in the United States may lead to surprise medical
bills.64 Surprise billing can also result when a patient receives non-emergency medical care,
but a complication arises during or after the procedure, requiring a consultation from an outof-network specialist.65 Many healthcare plans create insurance “narrow networks” of covered
doctors and hospitals with an exclusion of higher priced healthcare providers.66 If holders of
“narrow-network” plans receive out-of-network medical care, it is very likely that their
insurance plan will cover little to none of the costs, saddling patients with unexpected medical
54

Id. at 252.
Reed Abelson, Study Ties Bankruptcy to Medical Bills, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/02/business/study-ties-bankruptcy-to-medical-bills.html.
56
Lorie Konish, This is the real reason most Americans file for bankruptcy, CNBC (Feb. 11, 2019),
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/11/this-is-the-real-reason-most-americans-file-for-bankruptcy.html. (Estimated
66.5% of all bankruptcies attributable to healthcare costs.).
57
Id.
58
Abelson, supra note 55.
59
Id.
60
Blumenthal & Seervai, supra note 44.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Christopher Garmon & Benjamin Chartock, One In Five Inpatient Emergency Department Cases May Lead
To Surprise Bills, 36 HEALTH AFF. 177, 179 (Jan. 2017).
65
Blumenthal & Seervai, supra note 44.
66
Id.
55
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bills.67 In most of these cases, patients are unaware they are receiving out-of-network care or
unable to consent to out-of-network care.68
C. New York Takes Action
In 2012, the New York State Department of Financial Services released a
comprehensive report on surprise medical billing in the state in response to more than 2,000
complaints from residents.69 The report found that surprise medical billing greatly contributed
to overall medical debt, which was a leading cause of personal bankruptcy in the state.70 The
report revealed that patients were receiving surprise bills for emergency room services, such
as an $83,000 bill for an out-of-network plastic surgeon to reattach a severed finger.71
Emergency room visits often lead to surprise bills, because patients receiving emergency care
may not be in a condition to give informed consent.72
However, the leading cause of surprise medical billing surprisingly turned out to be
scheduled, non-emergency care.73 This problem arose most frequently in situations where
patients had consented to a procedure and cleared it with their insurer but were not informed
that an out-of-network specialist would be consulting or performing part of the procedure.74
The report cited one patient who diligently confirmed that both his surgeon and the hospital
where he was undertaking heart surgery were within his insurance network, only to recover
from surgery and find himself responsible for a $7,516 bill from an out-of-network surgeon
who participated in the procedure without the patient’s knowledge or consent.75 The report
identified common problems that led to surprise billing—namely comparison shopping
difficulty, lack of disclosure for non-emergency care, excessive billing, and reduced coverage
for out-of-network care.76 Further, the report went on to propose a series of reforms, including
increased transparency in patient care, prohibition of excessive charges, and the creation of
minimum insurance coverage.77
In response to the report and consumer complaints, New York passed the “Surprise
Bill” law, which was approved in October 2014 and went into effect on March 31, 2015.78
Under New York’s law, patients are not required to pay out-of-network provider charges for
surprise out-of-network services, so long as the charges are higher than the patient’s standard

67

Id.
Id.
69
BENJAMIN LAWSKY, N.Y. FIN. SERV., AN UNWELCOME SURPRISE: HOW NEW YORKERS ARE GETTING
STUCK WITH UNEXPECTED MEDICAL BILLS FROM OUT-OF-NETWORK PROVIDERS (Mar. 7, 2012),
http://www.statecoverage.org/node/4012.html.
70
Id. at 1.
71
Id. at 2.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
LAWSKY, supra note 69, at 2.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 2-4.
77
Id. at 36-37.
78
N.Y. Fin. Serv. § 601 (2014).
68
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in-network copayment, deductible, or coinsurance rate.79 New York’s law currently protects
patients in a variety of other circumstances where they might receive surprise medical bills.80
Patients are protected from surprise bills when they receive medical care at a participating
hospital or ambulatory surgical center in their insurance plan’s network, but are unknowingly
treated by an out-of-network physician without their written consent. This protection also
applies when an in-network physician refers the patient to an out-of-network provider and the
patient unknowingly uses their services.81 New Yorkers are also protected from surprise
billing for emergency services, including inpatient care following emergency treatment.82 The
New York law attempts to ameliorate the problem of insured patient costs by stipulating that
insurers must develop reasonable payment rates for out-of-network care, illustrate how their
out-of-network payments were calculated, and show how they compare to usual and
customary rates.83
New York’s Surprise Bill law also established an “independent dispute resolution
process” for healthcare providers and insurers.84 When providers and insurers disagree about
the costs of the out-of-network care the patient received, the New York law directs them to go
through a dispute resolution process rather than transfer costs directly to the patient.85 Section
6 of the Surprise Bill law requires a dispute resolution process which closely mirrors the
system of negotiation and final-offer arbitration found in MLB:
(6) When determining a reasonable fee for the services rendered, the
independent dispute resolution entity shall select either the health care
plan’s payment or the non-participating physician’s fee. An independent
dispute resolution entity shall determine which amount to select based
upon the conditions and factors set forth in section six hundred four of this
article.86
In addition to requiring arbitrators to select one party’s offer over another, the
dispute resolution process allows providers and insurers to participate in a series of
negotiations designed to help the parties reach an equitable resolution.87 If the negotiations
fail, the next step for providers and insurers is to present offers to neutral arbitrators.88 This
system of ADR —a series of negotiations followed by final-offer arbitration— closely
resembles that used by MLB.

79
NYS HEALTH, ISSUE BRIEF: NEW YORK’S EFFORTS TO REFORM SURPRISE MEDICAL BILLING 10 (Feb.
2019), https://nyshealthfoundation.org/resource/new-yorks-efforts-to-reform-surprise-medical-billing-2.
80
Surprise
Medical
Bills
and
Emergency
Services,
N.Y.
FIN.
SERV.
(2022),
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/consumers/health_insurance/surprise_medical_bills.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
N.Y. Fin. Serv. § 605 (2014).
85
Id.
86
N.Y. Fin. Serv. § 607 (2014).
87
Id.
88
Id.
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After hearing the parties present their offers, the panel of arbitrators are required to
consider a series of factors informing their decision on how to value the out-of-network care
the patient received:
In determining the appropriate amount to pay for a health care service, an
independent dispute resolution entity shall consider all relevant factors, including:
(a)
whether there is a gross disparity between the fee charged by the
physician or hospital for services rendered as compared to:
(1) fees paid to the involved physician or hospital for the same
services rendered by the physician or hospital to other patients in
health care plans in which the physician or hospital is not
participating, and
(2) in the case of a dispute involving a health care plan, fees paid by
the health care plan to reimburse similarly qualified physicians or
hospitals for the same services in the same region who are not
participating with the health care plan;
(b)
the level of training, education and experience of the physician,
and in the case of a hospital, the teaching staff, scope of services and case
mix;
(c)
the physician’s and hospital’s usual charge for comparable
services with regard to patients in health care plans in which the physician
or hospital is not participating;
(d)
the circumstances and complexity of the particular case,
including time and place of the service;
(e)
individual patient characteristics; and, with regard to physician
services,
(f)

the usual and customary cost of the service.89

These factors encourage the arbitration panel to select an offer that more closely
resembles the cost of in-network care. However, it balances these considerations with the time
and skill of the out-of-network medical provider.90
The arbitration panel is created and determined by the state superintendent, who is
charged with establishing a process for “certifying and selecting independent dispute
resolution entities.”91 The same section also provides that “[a]n independent dispute

89
90
91

N.Y. Fin. Serv. L. § 604 (2014).
Id.
N.Y. Fin. Serv. L. § 601 (2014).
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resolution entity shall use licensed physicians in active practice in the same or similar
specialty as the physician providing the service.”92
D. Impact of the New York State Law on Surprise Medical Billing
In passing these baseball-style arbitration provisions, legislators and healthcare
experts hoped that surprise billing medical costs would decrease in the state.93 Jeffrey Gold, a
senior vice president with the New York Hospital Association who worked on the law’s
drafting, stated, “In baseball arbitration, whoever is closer to reality wins…. I felt that was
very quick and easy and would very quickly set a market rate for what was an acceptable
behavior.”94 In a rare showing of solidarity, the plan was supported by both insurance
companies and an association of emergency room doctors, two groups who rarely find
themselves on the same side of medical billing disputes.95 Lawmakers, insurance companies,
and physician groups were hopeful the bill would solve the lingering problem of surprise
medical billing in the state.
More than five years after the passage of the Surprise Bill law, enough data has been
collected to provide insight into the bill’s practical effects. As of 2018, New York’s law had
been used to settle more than 2,000 billing disputes.96 Yale researchers found that the New
York law reduced out-of-network billing by thirty-four percent and lowered in-network
emergency physician payments by nine percent.97 Their data was based on 323,936
emergency room visits at New York hospitals between 2011 and 2015, which captures
approximately $1 billion in emergency health care spending.98 To test the impact of the New
York State laws, researchers compared New York hospitals’ out-of-network rates, physician
in-network payment rates, and facility payment rates before and after the legislation’s
passage.99 Andrew Cuomo, the former governor of New York, lauded the dispute resolution
program, announcing it saved New Yorkers more than $400 million in emergency medical
costs alone.100
These positive results seemingly contrast with the results of a 2019 report released
by the New York State Department of Financial Services, which found that healthcare costs
had generally risen in the state since the adoption of the 2014 surprise billing law.101 What is
the reason for this discrepancy between lower patient surprise bills and overall rising

92

Id.
Kliff, supra note 2.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Zack Cooper et al., Surprise! Out-Of-Network Billing For Emergency Care in the United States, NAT’L
BUREAU OF ECON. RSCH. (2018).
98
Id. at 33.
99
Id.
100
Governor Cuomo Announces of New York’s Landmark Out-Of-Network Law Protecting Consumers from
Surprise
Medical
Bills,
N.Y.
DEPT.
OF
FIN.
SERVICES,
(September
17,
2019),
https://dfs.ny.gov/reports_and_publications/press_releases/pr1909173.
101
Linda A. Lacewell, New York’s Surprise Out-of-Network Protection Law: Report on the Independent
Dispute Resolution Process, N.Y. DEPT. OF FIN. SERVICES (2019) https://www.dfs.ny.gov/
system/files/documents/2019/09/dfs_oon_idr.pdf.
93
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healthcare costs? Physicians are responding to surprise billing protection laws by increasing
their in-network fees, and insurance companies are increasing premium rates, which in turn
raises health care costs for all consumers. 102
IV. SURPRISE MEDICAL BILLING REFORMS ON THE FEDERAL LEVEL
The issue of surprise medical billing has gained increased attention at the national
level since the adoption of New York and other states’ surprise medical billing laws.103 The
Covid-19 pandemic further heightened executive and legislative interest in a federal solution,
resulting in new protections for consumers that went into effect in 2022.104 This legislation
represents a massive win for consumer protection and surprise medical billing reform at the
national level.
A.

Surprise Medical Billing Under the Trump and Biden Administrations

In January 2019, the Trump administration directed government officials to find a
solution for surprise medical billing.105 As the issue of medical debt and surprise medical
billing gained national prominence, multiple congressional bills were proposed attempting to
lessen surprise bills.106 Senator Maggie Hassan (D-NH) partnered with Senator Bill Cassidy
(R-LA) to lead a bipartisan effort to end surprise medical billing.107 In 2019, the Senate
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions (HELP) Committee introduced the STOP Surprise
Medical Bills Act as part of the Lower Health Care Costs Act, a broader package of
legislation to address health care costs.108
In 2020, Congress passed the No Surprises Act as a part of a broader Covid-19
economic relief bill.109 As of January 2022, the No Surprises Act protects patients from
surprise bills for out-of-network medical care.110 Consumers are protected from surprise
billing when they seek emergency care, are transported via air ambulance, and receive
medical care at an in-network hospital but are unknowingly treated by an out-of-network
physician.111 The No Surprises Act makes it illegal for healthcare and insurance providers to
102
Michael Ollove, Laws to Curb Surprise Medical Bills Might Be Inflating Health Care Costs, PEW (May 20,
2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2021/05/20/laws-to-curb-surprisemedical-bills-might-be-inflating-health-care-costs.
103
Mihir Dekhne et al., Federal Policy To End Surprise Billing: Building On Prior Approaches, HEALTH
AFFAIRS (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/forefront.20190221.859328/full.
104
Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, Consumer relief: COVID bill to end ‘surprise ’medical bills, AP NEWS (Dec. 21,
2020), https://apnews.com/article/covid-bill-end-surprise-medical-bills-d17da7204ade433d20ea8305c2d0538c.
105
Dekhne et al., supra note 93.
106
See generally id.
107
See Alonso-Zaldivar, supra note 104.
108
See generally id.
109
Loren Adler et al., Understanding the No Surprises Act, USC-BROOKINGS SCHAEFFER ON HEALTH POLICY
(Feb.
4,
2021),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/usc-brookings-schaeffer-on-healthpolicy/2021/02/04/understanding-the-no-surprises-act/.
110
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Julie Appleby, Congress Acts to Spare Consumers from Costly Surprise Medical Bills, NPR (Dec. 22, 2020,
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bill patients more than they would receive for in-network cost-sharing established by the
patients’ insurance (with the notable exception of ground ambulance services).112 Health plans
must treat out-of-network medical care as if it were in-network when calculating patient costsharing.113 The new law does grant exceptions for consumers who want to be treated by an
out-of-network specialist, provided that the physician gives a good-faith cost estimate and the
patient consents within 72 hours of the scheduled treatment.114
To resolve disputes over surprise bills, the federal legislation establishes a baseball
arbitration process to determine how much insurers must pay out-of-network physicians.115 It
gives insurers and healthcare providers 30 days to try to negotiate payment for out-of-network
bills.116 If a provider is dissatisfied with a health plan’s payment and cannot settle an amount
through negotiation, they can initiate arbitration.117 The Secretaries of the U.S. Departments
of Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury are tasked with establishing a process to
certify a pool of neutral arbitrators with relevant expertise and no conflicts of interest.118 The
No Surprises Act calls for the insurer and provider to jointly agree upon an arbitrator from
that pool.119 If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, the federal government will select
an arbitrator from the pool.120 Both parties must pay an administrative fee for engaging an
arbitrator.121 Additionally, the losing party must pay the arbitrator’s fee.122 The burdens
imposed by this process give parties additional incentives to negotiate a settlement within the
proposed 30-day window.
One neutral arbitrator must select between the final offers submitted by each party,
“taking into consideration several factors including the health plan’s historical median innetwork rate for similar services.”123 This is a significant departure from the criteria used in
similar state level surprise billing reforms, which typically rely on billed charges or Medicare
and Medicaid rates.124 Lawmakers are hopeful that these arbitrator instructions strike an
acceptable compromise between the wants of providers and insurers, and will secure a net win
for consumers.125 The Congressional Budget Office predicts that the law will save taxpayers
$17 billion over ten years by reducing commercial insurance premiums between 0.5% and
1%.126 While there remains uncertainty surrounding the true economic effect of these new
arbitration provisions, the experience of states like New York provides insight into possible
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nationwide consequences and emphasizes the importance of well-crafted arbitration
guidelines.
B. Impact of Arbitration Instructions on the Success of Healthcare Reform
The relative success of surprise billing laws depends on what factors the arbitrator is
allowed to consider when selecting a final offer, as evidenced by the results of state-level
reforms. According to a New York Department of Financial Services, when state guidance
allowed arbitrators to consider the 80th percentile of billed charges (list prices higher than
what 80% of other physicians charge for a given service), New York experienced dramatic
inflation in healthcare costs.127 Physicians’ “billed charges” are typically many times higher
than in-network or Medicare rates.128 Experts describe billed charges as “totally made up” as
providers can set prices “largely unmoored from market forces”129 By instructing arbiters to
consider the 80th percentile of billed charges, New York unintentionally provided incentives
for physicians to artificially inflate prices for healthcare services.
These incentives for healthcare providers to raise prices creates a domino effect on
the entire healthcare industry. When physicians can attain higher reimbursements for surprise
bills through arbitration, they have greater leverage against insurers during the negotiation
stage.130 As previously mentioned, final-offer arbitration’s strength as a dispute resolution tool
is that it encourages parties to voluntarily negotiate settlements, for fear they stand to lose
everything in arbitration.131 If insurers have to consistently negotiate higher settlements to
avoid the risk of losing even more in arbitration, they may seek to recoup that loss through
other means. New York’s insurance groups generally responded to providers’ newfound
leverage by raising premiums for healthcare insurance.132
While disputes over surprise medical bills were once offloaded directly onto the
consumer, reforms leave providers and insurers fighting over the remaining costs. Insurance
groups want to limit the amount of money they are forced to pay out to providers, and
healthcare providers want to recoup the out-of-network value of their services.133 The
inclusion of baseball-style arbitration provisions were meant to help the parties reach fair
agreements over the value of these medical services.134 However, when arbitrators are
allowed to consider the higher end of physicians’ billed charges in selecting a final offer,
these costs are still ultimately transferred to the consumer. While individual patients may get
a reprieve from the devastating financial effects of surprise bills, all consumers could
experience rising insurance premiums and healthcare costs.
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As evidenced by the state level impact of arbitration guidelines, the factors
governing arbitrator decisions at the federal level have serious implications for healthcare
nationwide. In light of these high stakes, the drafting of the No Surprises Act provoked
contentious debates among providers and insurers regarding what guidelines the arbitrators
should be able to consider when selecting a final offer.135 Insurers advocated for a standard
based on lower Medicare or Medicaid prices, rather than a flexible criteria taking into account
billed charges.136 In contrast, healthcare providers lobbied for Congress to adopt guidelines
similar to those in New York, which take into account physicians’ billed charges, among
other factors.137 Lawmakers settled on something of a middle ground, barring consideration of
billed charges, but also abandoning a Medicare or Medicaid standard benchmark.138 Instead,
the No Surprises Act allows arbitrators to consider the median in-network prices paid by each
insurer for the particular medical service in dispute.139 In addition to the in-network rate, the
arbitrator is instructed to consider several relevant factors:
1. The “qualifying payment amount,” which…. is generally the insurer’s
median in-network rate for similar services in that geographic region as of
2019, inflated forward by the Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers (CPI-U); 2. Demonstrations of good faith efforts (or lack
thereof) to reach a network agreement and any contracted rates between
the two parties during the previous four years; 3. Market shares of both
parties; 4. Patient acuity; and 5. The level of training, experience, and
quality of the clinician, or the teaching status, case mix, and scope of
services offered by the facility.140
In-network rates have the benefit of being set by insurers, who have incentives to
keep rates down.141 However, there still remains a significant amount of uncertainty
surrounding the eventual economic impact of these new guidelines. Healthcare policy experts
at the Brookings Institute point out that in-network rates are still vulnerable to manipulation
because they are typically negotiated between insurers and providers.142 Arbitrators can also
consider factors like past in-network rates, and that would largely benefit physician groups
who were once able to leverage surprise billing against insurers in negotiations and secure
contracts with higher in-network rates.143
Given the uncertainty surrounding in-network rates, Congress ought to have
instructed arbitrators to consider the price of medical services based on Medicare or Medicaid
rates. Thanks to state level surprise billing laws, researchers and policy experts have access to
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data on the inflationary impact of different arbitration criteria. Georgetown researchers found
that comparable anti-surprise billing laws passed in states such as California, Colorado,
Maine, Maryland, Michigan, and Oregon generally produce less inflationary results using
Medicare rates and excluding billed charges.144 In states that instructed arbitrators to consider
the prices of healthcare services based on Medicare and Medicaid, providers had fewer
incentives to raise the price of medical services and less leverage to negotiate higher innetwork rates.145
The ultimate choice to use in-network rates rather than Medicare or Medicaid is
likely due to political expediency. Despite bipartisan support for surprise billing protections
for consumers, when crafting the bill lawmakers, struggled to identify a method for resolving
payment disputes that is acceptable to both providers and insurers.146 As discussed above,
providers typically prefer arbitration over a standard benchmark, because it allows them to
secure payments higher than they could normally achieve under a government set rate
standard.147 They are also strongly opposed to guidelines that instruct arbitrators to consider
Medicare or Medicaid rates, because they are significantly lower than physicians’ billed
charges, or even in-network rates.148 Using a Medicare or Medicaid benchmark, while
beneficial for insurance groups and consumers, would have been “anathema” to providers.149
When final offer amounts selected by arbitrators are higher than standard in-network
rates, it can raise the cost of the out-of-network service if the payer previously limited its
payment to the in-network rate, or it can lead to higher in-network rates in future contract
negotiations if providers see that they can receive more money from out-of-network rates.150
Whether these final-offer arbitration provisions will result in higher healthcare prices largely
depends on arbitrators’ decisions and what insurers currently pay for out-of-network care.
Consumers and lawmakers will have to take a wait-and-see approach on the effect of these
new arbitration guidelines when the No Surprises Act goes into effect in 2022. If arbitrators
largely base their determinations on median in-network rates, experts hope the law will exert
some downward pressure on health care costs and premiums.151 But if arbitrators generally
favor providers, the legislation might result in no savings or even potentially increase
healthcare costs in the coming years.
V. CONCLUSION
Baseball or “final-offer” arbitration emerged as a method of salary negotiations in
MLB, but its practical applications may extend far beyond its origins. Its recent application to
the nationwide problem of surprise medical billing has highlighted its strengths and
weaknesses as a method of ADR. Overall, the passage of state and federal surprise billing
reform laws, such as the No Surprises Act, are a huge win for consumer protection. Patients
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will no longer be saddled with burdensome medical debt from unknowingly receiving out-ofnetwork care. Given surprise medical billing’s contributions to medical debt in the United
States, these laws could lead to a reduction in overall rates of medical debt and bankruptcy.
However, they also have the potential to create an inflationary effect in the healthcare market,
leading to soaring insurance premiums and increased healthcare costs for all consumers.
Central to this debate are the guidelines arbitrators can consider, as the nuances of these
baseball arbitration provisions can have an enormous impact on the costs of healthcare
services and insurance premiums. When applied to disputes between healthcare providers and
insurers, just one of the factors arbitrators are instructed to consider can have a domino effect
on the entire healthcare market. The impact of arbitration instructions highlights just how
central baseball arbitration provisions are to the overall success of surprise billing reform in
the United States.
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